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THE COMMITMENT TO PARTICIPATE
RULE:' THE NCAA FIGHTS TO KEEP THE
2
MARCH MADNESS BALL IN ITS COURT
PAUL FELLIN*

INTRODUCTION

Every year, sports fans across the country sit in front of their
television sets and watch one of sport's greatest events, the
National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") Basketball
Tournament. 3 Played in front of huge crowds in arenas across the
country, with billions of dollars in revenue produced, the NCAA
Basketball Tournament is the crown jewel of NCAA athletics.4 At
* J.D. Candidate, St. John's University School of Law, June 2006; B.S. Finance, St.
John's University, May 2003. The author would like to thank all of those who supported
him throughout the writing of this Note, especially his friends and family, who always
knew how to put him in his place. He would also like to thank Professor Cavanagh for
being an inspiration to write this Note, and also for his wisdom and guidance. Last but
certainly not least, thanks to the entire staff of St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary
for doing an amazing editing job on this piece.
1 NCAA, 2005-06 DIVISION I MANUAL § 31.2.1.1 (2005) [hereinafter Manual]. "Eligible
members in a sport who are not also members of the National Association of
Intercollegiate Athletics will participate (if selected) in the NCAA championship or in no
postseason competition in that sport." See Federal Court Denies Summary Judgment
Motions by Both Parties in Metropolitan IntercollegiateBasketball Association's Antitrust
Suit Challenging NCAA's Postseason Competition Rules, ENT. L. REP., March 22, 2005
[hereinafter Federal Court Denies], for a discussion that the 'Commitment to Participate
Rule' requires a team invited to participate in an NCAA championship tournament to
play in that competition only and no other.
2 This Note was written prior to the settlement of the lawsuit between the MIBA and
the NCAA. All arguments and analysis were constructed with no knowledge of any
impending settlement. A Postscript is included at the conclusion of this Note to explain
the terms of the settlement and the effects it will have on antitrust law in the future.
3 See Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass'n v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563, 565
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (explaining that sixty-five teams participate in the NCAA Tournament,
which crowns a national champion for Division I Men's college basketball); see also
Edward N. Matisik, NIT Sues Under Sherman Anti-Trust Act, CHN COLLEGE
BASKETBALL, Feb. 4, 2005, http://www.collegehoopsnet.com/specials/050204.htm (noting
there has been an explosion of interest in the NCAA basketball tournament in the past
fifteen years).
4 See Sarah M. Konsky, Comment, An Antitrust Challenge to the NCAA Transfer
Rules, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1581, 1584 (2003) (stating that the NCAA has signed a $6 billion
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the same time, the rival National Invitational Tournament
("NIT') proceeds with much less fanfare. 5 Due to the fact that the
NCAA features the nation's premier college basketball teams and
the NIT consists of schools that are not invited to the NCAA,
most fans pay little attention to the NIT, except loyal alumni and
college basketball fanatics. 6 Fifty years ago, however, that was
not the case. 7 The NIT was the tournament every college strived
for, and the winner was invariably crowned the mythical national
champion of college basketball.8
Over the last half century, the NCAA Tournament has
surpassed the NIT in terms of popularity, 9 revenue, and quality
of play. The NCAA in that time has expanded from 24 teams to
65.10 This expansion was largely caused by a 1981 NCAA By-law,
contract with CBS to broadcast the NCAA Tournament); see also Mark Alesia, Antitrust
Case Puts NCAA on Defense; NIT Suit Over Tournament Will Go to Court Monday,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 31, 2005, at 1A (noting that in 1999, the NCAA signed a $6.2
billion, 11-year agreement with CBS for the tournament and marketing rights).
5 See Metro, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 566 (explaining that Postseason NIT has 40
participants and "is the only postseason Division I men's basketball tournament other
than the NCAA Tournament"); see also Matisik, supra note 3 (noting commentators' joke
that winning NIT nowadays means the team can only boast of being ranked #66).
6 See Metro, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 568 (noting that most participants in NIT are of lesser
quality than participants in NCAA); Alesia, supra note 4 (stating that NIT has been
greatly overshadowed by NCAA Tournament).
7 See Symposium, Maurice Clarett's Challenge, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 391, 428 (Winter 2005) (noting that, in the 1950's, NIT was a much larger
tournament than NCAA); see also Matisik, supra note 3 (stating that in the 1950's, NIT
was much more prestigious than NCAA).
8 See Matisik, supra note 3. Some schools chose to play in both tournaments. Id. In
1950, the City College of New York actually won both the NIT and the NCAA. Id.
Colleges continued to occasionally turn down the NCAA for the NIT up until 1970, when
Marquette was the last school to do so. Id. See also Alesia, supra note 4, discussing that in
the first few decades of the NIT's existence, the winner of the tournament was considered
the national champion.
9 See Survey, 2004 Annual Survey: Recent Developments in Sports Law, 15 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 531, 535 (2005) [hereinafter 2004 Annual Survey] (noting that NIT's
popularity has foundered over recent years, which NIT attributes to NCAA rules); see also
Matisik, supra note 3 (explaining NCAA Tournament expansion to 65 teams has caused
NIT to lose prestige over past 30 years).
10 See Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass'n v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563, 566-68
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). The NCAA has enacted several rules over the year to limit the popularity
of the NIT. In 1953, the NCAA prohibited colleges from participating in more than one
postseason college basketball tournament. In 1961, the NCAA stated that it "expected"
colleges to participate in the NCAA Tournament if they were invited. During the 1970's
and 1980's, the NCAA Tournament continued to expand, and all restrictions on the
number of teams that could participate from each conference were eliminated. The
original 'Commitment to Participate Rule' was passed by the NCAA in 1981. See id. at
566-67. See 2004 Annual Survey, supranote 9, at 535-36, discussing that the NCAA rules
that MIBA claimed were anticompetitive included NCAA's Commitment to Participate
Rule, One Post-season Tournament Rule, the End of the Playing Season rule, the
Automatic Qualification of Conference Champions Rule, and the 65 team bracket.
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31.2.1.1, better known as the "Commitment to Participate
Rule."" Whereas NCAA schools once had an option to play in the
NCAA or the NIT, NCAA regulations now require teams invited
to the NCAA Tournament to play there or not at all. 12 As a result
of this by-law, colleges invited to play in a sport's official
championship may not play in the NIT.13 Failing to comply with
this rule is considered a major violation, but sanctions have not
been determined or exacted since no school has ever violated the

rule. 14
The NIT has been run by an association of five New York area
colleges, known as the Metropolitan Intercollegiate Basketball
Association ("MIBA").15 Angry over the NCAA rule and
dwindling interest in its tournament, 16 the MIBA brought suit in
the Southern District of New York against the NCAA,17 claiming
violations of the Sherman Act.18 The MIBA looked to challenge
certain rules promulgated by the NCAA which the MIBA argued
were anticompetitive under the Sherman Act.19 The MIBA
11 See Manual, supra note 1, at by-law 31.2.1.1. The rule has been in place for every
year other than 1991. It was eliminated in May of 1990 and not put back into place until
August of 1991. See also Symposium, supra note 7, at 428 noting that because the NCAA
did not like the competition of the NIT, it enacted rules that did not allow those invited to
the NCAA Tournament to participate in any other tournaments.
12 See Manual, supra note 1, at by-law 31.2.1.1 (clarifying that schools no longer had
an option); see also Federal Court Denies, supra note 1 (noting MIBA's claim that NCAA's
by-law effectively requires any team invited to participate in NCAA's Tournament to
boycott NIT).
13 See Metro., 337 F. Supp. 2d at 567 (noting that the rule ended any controversy over
whether colleges were required to play in the NCAA Tournament, or if they were only
expected to participate); see also Matisik, supra note 3 (explaining that, in 1981, when
NCAA adopted the 'Commitment to Participation Rule,' schools could no longer turn down
an NCAA bid in favor of an NIT bid).
14 See Metro., 337 F. Supp. 2d at 567 (explaining that normal penalties for violating
one of NCAA's major rules are fines and/or playing sanctions such as limiting postseason
participation or exposure on television); see also Matisik, supra note 3 (explicating that
NIT "believes that in recent years several schools would have turned down their NCAA
bids and accepted an NIT bid if it had not been for the CPR").
15 See Alesia, supra note 4 (explaining that NIT has been run by MIBA since 1938);
Matisik, supra note 3 (noting that the five New York area schools that run NIT include
St. John's, Fordham, Wagner, New York University, and Manhattan College).
16 See Rafael Hermoso, College Basketball; N.I.T. Organizers File Suit, Calling
N.C.A.A. a Threat, N.Y. TIMES, January 5, 2001, at D5 (noting that organizers of NIT
claim that NCAA's proposed rules would destroy NIT tournaments and that the
'Commitment to Participate Rule' has transformed NIT into a second-class event);
Matisik, supra note 3 (explaining that MIBA believes that NCAA is trying to drive NIT
out of business, and therefore gain a monopoly in college basketball championships).
17 See generally Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass'n. v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d
563 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
18 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2005).
19 See Metro, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 565 (challenging NCAA rules).
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claimed both unreasonable restraints of trade under § 1 of the
Sherman Act,20 and monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman
Act. 2 1 Both parties moved for summary judgment, but both
motions were denied in separate hearings. 22 The case is
proceeding towards trial. 23
This Note will focus on the upcoming trial between the NCAA
and MIBA, with careful consideration of the role that antitrust
law should play in regards to NCAA activity. Part I will focus on
the history of antitrust regulation, with emphasis on particular
tests that courts have applied. Part II will focus on past judicial
regulation of NCAA activity and will also examine NCAA
arguments for the need for deference in areas which it regulates.
Part III will explain why the 'Commitment to Participate Rule'
fails any tests of legality that courts have established in the past.
Part IV will detail recommendations for future standards in
regulating the NCAA in order to create bright-line rules and end
the uncertainty that exists today.

20 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2005). § 1 states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of
a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $
100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $ 1,000,000, or by imprisonment
not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
21 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004). § 2 states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a
corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
22 See Metro, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 573 (denying MIBA's motion for summary judgment
because of genuine issues of material fact regarding conduct of NCAA); see also Metro.
Intercollegiate Basketball Ass'n. v. NCAA, 339 F. Supp. 2d 545, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(denying NCAA's motion for summary judgment because MIBA raised genuine issues of
material fact as to possible violations of Sherman Act by NCAA).
23 See Metro., 337 F. Supp. 2d at 573 (noting that MIBA's motion for summary
judgment is denied because MIBA has not shown that NCAA had a specific intent to
monopolize tournaments). But see supra note 2; discussion infra Postscript.
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I.

THE COMMITMENT TO PARTICIPATE RULE
SHERMAN ACT ANALYSIS IN NON-TRADITIONAL BUSINESS
AREAS

Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids "every contract,
combination.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States."24 The Supreme Court, in several
cases, has interpreted "every" to mean that only "unreasonable
restraints of trade" 2 5 are prohibited. 2 6 The traditional test in
analyzing restraints of trade involved an examination of 1) the
history behind the restraint, 2) any evils existing because of the
restraint, and 3) the purposes behind the restraint.2 7 This
28
became known as rule of reason analysis.
Nevertheless, some conduct is so pernicious and so devoid of
pro-competitive benefit that courts will condemn it on its face as
a naked restraint of trade. 2 9 Examples of such conduct include
price fixing, 3 0 horizontal territorial restraints, 31 and tying
agreements. 32 Another area of conduct that the Supreme Court
24 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
25 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 54 (1911) (stating that freedom
of contract needs to be protected, and only unreasonable restraints of trade are illegal).
See generally Tomac, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 418 F. Supp. 359 (C.D. Cal 1976) (discussing
some unreasonable restraints of trade).
26 See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 55 (explaining evils resulting from such restraints
and why such evils need to be banned); see also Coca-Cola, 418 F. Supp. at 362 (stating
that restraint of trade is required to be found unreasonable before it can violate Sherman
Act).
27 See Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1917) (detailing an analysis of
restraint which looks at history, nature, and purpose behind restraint); see also Winter
Hill Frozen Foods & Services Inc., v. Haagen-Dazs Co., 691 F. Supp. 539, 545 (D. Mass.
1988) (describing standards in terms of lawful trade activities).
28 See David Scott Moreland, The Antitrust Implications of the Bowl Championship
Series: An Analysis Through Analogous Reasoning, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 721, 728-29
(2005) (noting that the rule follows the totality of circumstances test); see also United
States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining that plaintiff has initial
burden of proof when it comes to rule of reason).
29 See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (stating that
certain agreements are conclusively presumed illegal without detailed inquiry into the
harm caused because of their destructive effects); see also Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 607 (1914) (describing wrongful activities of
defendants who intended to restrain trade).
30 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) (holding
price fixing illegal per se under Sherman Act); see also United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (stating that price fixing is an unreasonable restraint of
trade).
31 See United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (holding that
agreements among competitors to allocate territories are illegal per se); see also White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (stating that horizontal territorial
limitations only stifle competition).
32 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330 (1962) (stating that use of
tying devices rarely coincides with purposes of competition); see also Standard Oil v.
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has usually found per se illegal is group boycotts. 33 Group
boycotts involve some level of agreement among competitors to
drive a rival from the market by denying them a source of
customers or a source of supply. 34 Due to the lack of procompetitive benefits that these strategies have, the Supreme
Court has held group boycotts to be per se illegal. 35 However, not
all restraints among competitors are illegal on their face. There
are situations where the Supreme Court has found that an
industry's characteristics are so unique that restraints might be
necessary for that industry to succeed. 3 6 While special
circumstances will not save a defendant from antitrust scrutiny
completely, 3 7 the defendant in such cases will be allowed to offer
justifications of its behavior. 38
Traditional rule of reason analysis involves three steps. 39 The
plaintiff first has the burden of proving adverse economic effects
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949) (explaining that tying agreements are mainly
used to limit competition).
33 See Klor's, Inc., v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (holding that
group boycotts have long been considered a category of conduct that is forbidden by
Sherman Act); see also Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1063
(C.D. Cal 1971) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5) (stating that group boycotts
are among practices which courts have deemed unlawful).
34 See Klor's, 359 U.S. at 213 (noting that agreement involved many manufacturers
and retailers in an effort to drive a retailer out of business); see also Fashion Originators'
Guild, Inc., v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941) (noting that petitioners' group boycott served
to regulate and restrain interstate commerce).
35 See Kior's, 359 U.S. at 212 (describing effects of such agreements and noting that
they cripple ability of sellers to compete); see also Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1063
(stating that the Supreme Court has recognized group boycotts as per se illegal).
36 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1979) (noting that unique
market conditions exist in music licensing industry that would make use of per se analysis
highly inappropriate because in-depth analysis of market is needed to come to a just
decision); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Cinram Int'l, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 370,
376 (D. Del. 2004) (stating that in certain situations, competitors have been allowed to
form pooled activities).
37 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120, 126 (1984)
(holding that NCAA had violated Sherman Act, even though it was a unique area of
business where per se analysis would be inappropriate); see also Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs
v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 576 (1982) (holding that nonprofit organizations can be
held liable under Sherman Act).
38 See BroadcastMusic, 441 U.S. at 24 (holding that blanket license program should
be analyzed by lower courts under rule of reason scheme rather than strict per se
scrutiny); see also Cont'l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977) (holding
that all vertical restrictions are not per se illegal but instead should be analyzed under
rule of reason).
39 See K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir.
1995) (explaining three-step process that courts have applied when performing rule of
reason analysis, which involves analyzing all relevant commercial circumstances); see also
GTE, 433 U.S. at 49 (stating that under rule of reason, all circumstances of case are
weighed in deciding whether restrictive practice should be prohibited).
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from the defendant's activity. 40 Once met, the burden shifts to
the defendant to prove the pro-competitive benefits of its
conduct. 4 1 If the defendant carries this burden, the plaintiff must
then show some less restrictive means to achieve these procompetitive benefits. 4 2 Plaintiffs faced with the Rule of Reason
face an uphill battle, and therefore defendants will always push
43
for this standard to be applied.
One area that traditionally has been subject to rule of reason
analysis is that of professional and collegiate sports. 4 4 Sports are
a unique industry which requires some restraints on
competition.4 5 The essence of sports requires each team to have a
chance to succeed, and the enjoyment would be lost if one team
was able to crush the competition.4 6 Much tension exists,
40 See K.M.B., 61 F.3d at 127 (stating that "[p]laintiff bears the initial burden of
showing that the challenged action has had an actual adverse effect on competition as a
whole in the relevant market."); see also Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley
Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that proof that plaintiff has been
harmed as an individual competitor does not satisfy initial burden).
41 See K.MB., 61 F.3d at 127 (stating that "[i]f the plaintiff succeeds, the burden
shifts to the defendant to establish the pro-competitive 'redeeming virtues' of the action");
see also Discon Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 86 F. Supp. 2d 154, 159 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating
that if plaintiff satisfies initial burden, defendant must establish "pro-competitive
,redeeming virtues" of its conduct).
42 See KMB., 61 F.3d at 127 (stating that "[s]hould the defendant carry this burden,
the plaintiff must then show that the same pro-competitive effect could be achieved
through an alternative means that is less restrictive of competition."); see also Bhan v.
NME Hosp., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that if defendant meets his
burden, plaintiff "must then try to show that any legitimate objectives can be achieved in
a substantially less restrictive manner").
43 See Mark C. Anderson, Self-Regulation and League Rules Under the Sherman Act,
30 CAP. U. L. REV. 125, 129-30 (2002) (noting that because plaintiff has initial burden of
proof, defendants have a much better chance of winning the case than under per se
analysis); see also Shlomi Feiner, Regulation of Playing Equipment by Sports
Associations: The Antitrust Implications, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 585, 599 (2002) (noting
that "a rule of reason analysis ... tends to operate in favor of defendants in the sports
industry").
44 See Smith v. Pro Football, 593 F.2d 1173, 1179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that
because NFL Draft is not a classic group boycott as teams are not "true" competitors in
classic commercial sense, Draft should be judged under rule of reason standards); see also
Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 619-20 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding "the unique nature of the
business of professional football renders it inappropriate to mechanically apply per se
illegality rules," and rule of reason should be applied instead).
45 See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1179 (noting that even though NFL teams compete on
playing field, there needs to be some level of cooperation on many aspects of business in
order to ensure a high level of quality to the entertainment product they put out on field);
see also San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966, 969-70 (C.D. Cal. 1974)
(stating that even though National Hockey League teams compete athletically, the main
purpose of the League is to produce "sporting events of uniformly high quality").
46 See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1179 (explaining that no NFL team is looking to drive all
other teams from competition because then fans will no longer have a rooting interest and
the league will have to close down); see also NHL, 379 F. Supp. at 969-70 (stating that
teams within National Hockey League are not competitors in an economic sense, and that

508

ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 20:2

however, because sports are still a commercial enterprise that
requires regulation.47 This tension has been particularly strong
in the area of NCAA activity. 4 8 To further cloud the situation,
courts not only have to deal with the debate regarding whether
NCAA regulation is commercial, but also whether policy concerns
require the NCAA to be left alone to regulate as it sees fit.49
Section 2 of the Sherman Act forbids monopolization and
attempted monopolization. 50 Proof of monopolization requires a
two step inquiry. 5 1 First, the court requires proof of monopoly
power, which involves the power to restrain price or exclude
competition, and may be inferred from a dominant share of the
marketplace. 52 Once monopoly power has been shown, plaintiffs
need to show the defendant's willful acquisition and maintenance
of that power. 53 Therefore, in order to prove monopoly power,
NHL's organizational structure does not restrain trade but rather "makes possible a
segment of commercial activity which could hardly exist without it").
47 See Thomas Scully, NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma: The
NCAA's Television Plan is Sacked by the Sherman Act, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 857, 867- 68
(1985) (explaining that college and professional sports do make a lot of money and
therefore are commercial enterprise); see also Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v.
NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1288 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (explaining that NCAA is a business
involving millions of dollars that seeks to "maximize revenue and minimize expense" like
any other business).
48 See Scully, supra note 47, at 867 (detailing NCAA arguments that it is a selfregulating organization which does not need interference from antitrust regulation
because it is largely a noncommercial organization); see also Hennessey v. NCAA, 564
F.2d 1136, 1149 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that although NCAA is a voluntary, non-profit
organization, it is not entitled to total exemption from anti-trust laws).
49 See Scully, supra note 47, at 867 (noting that traditional judicial history afforded
much leeway to self-regulated organizations such as NCAA because their activities posed
no threat to commercial competition); see also Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D.
Mass. 1975) (holding Sherman Act does not reach actions of NCAA members in setting
eligibility standards because it is not commercial activity).
50 See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2005) (stating that anyone found to be
monopolizing shall be guilty of a felony and equating attempted monopolization as same
level of offense as monopolization); see also Smalley & Co. v. Emerson & Cuming, Inc., 808
F. Supp. 1503, 1511 (D. Colo. 1992) (stating that "Section 2 of the Sherman Act forbids
monopolization, combinations or conspiracies to monopolize, and attempts to
monopolize").
51 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (noting that there
is traditionally a two-step inquiry when performing analysis under § 2 of the Sherman
Act); see also United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 390 (1956)
(discussing how a monopoly involves something more than commercial success).
52 See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570 (stating that the first element is "the possession of
monopoly power in the relevant market"); see also American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781, 797-98 (1946) (finding over two-thirds of entire domestic field of cigarettes
and over 80% of field of comparable cigarettes to amount to a monopoly).
53 See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71 (stating that the second element is "the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as
a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident"); see also
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plaintiffs must prove that a defendant has both the requisite size,
along with the presence of "bad acts."54 The key step to monopoly
analysis is the identification of the relevant market and the
determination of market share. 5 5 If a large enough share of the
market can be proven, courts will then often ask the defendant to
prove that its power is obtained through legitimate means, such
as the presence of a superior product. 56
II. ONGOING LEGAL BATTLES FOR THE NCAA
A. Past Victories for the NCAA
In the past, the NCAA has successfully defended a number of
antitrust allegations leveled against it.57 In Jones v. NCAA,58 a
federal district court in Massachusetts upheld NCAA eligibility
requirements.5 9 In Jones, the plaintiff sought to play
intercollegiate ice hockey, but was denied by the NCAA.60 The
NCAA stated that plaintiff had violated its by-laws by playing in
an amateur league in which he received compensation for living

United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding a ninety
percent production rate to constitute a monopoly within market).
54 See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571 (clarifying that monopoly power, which is "the power
to control prices or exclude competition" may be inferred from a dominant share in
market); see also American Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 811 (finding that authorities support
view that, "the material consideration in determining whether a monopoly exists is not
that prices are raised and that competition actually is excluded but that power exists to
raise prices or to exclude competition when it is desired to do so").
55 See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571. The Court gave several examples of market shares
that would constitute monopoly power. It found 90% of the market, or even two-thirds of
the market, to be a substantial monopoly. See also E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 395, stating
the rule for determining the control of price and competition within the relevant market.
56 See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571 (discussing percentages in market that would
constitute a large enough share); see also Verizon Commc'ns., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407-08 (2004) (holding that "[flirms may acquire monopoly power
by establishing an infrastructure that renders them uniquely suited to serve their
customers").
57 See, e.g., Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1154 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that
NCAA by-laws regulating assistant coaches did not violate Sherman Act); Gaines v.
NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 748 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (holding that NCAA eligibility rules
against a student who declared for NFL draft did not violate Sherman Act).
58 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
59 Id. at 304 (denying plaintiffs request for restraining order that would have allowed
him to play intercollegiate ice hockey for Northeastern University).
60 See id. at 297-98 (explaining that after plaintiff filled out an "Ice Hockey
Questionnaire" from the NCAA, the NCAA found he had violated amateurism rules and
therefore was declared ineligible to play ice hockey for the 1974-75 season).
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expenses. 6 1 The court found no merits in plaintiffs Sherman Act
claims. 62 In holding this way, the court stated that the purpose of
the NCAA was to promote amateurism in college sports, and
these rules were needed to carry out that purpose. 6 3 There was
no conspiracy to keep professional athletes from playing, and
NCAA purposes were reasonable. 6 4 Also, plaintiffs claim of
monopolization failed because the court found "no evidence
presently on the record that the Association's current preeminence in the field is the result of anything other than its own
skill, foresight and industry." 6 5
In 1977, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld
NCAA by-laws in Hennessey v. NCAA.66 Two assistant football
coaches challenged an NCAA by-law limiting the number of full
time assistant coaches that a college could employ. 67 Plaintiffs
had been full time coaches for over seven years. 6 8 After the bylaw
was enacted by the NCAA, plaintiffs were forced to take a parttime position with their respective schools. 69 The court did not
give the NCAA total exemption from antitrust laws, 7 0 but did

61 See id. at 297. Plaintiff played for several amateur ice hockey teams before he went
to college from 1969 to 1974. His compensation included: $500 for tuition expenses, $500
signing bonus, $25 for room and board, and $10 for living expenses. Id. at 297 n. 1.
62 See id. at 303 ('The 'competition' which the plaintiff seeks to protect does not
originate in the marketplace or as a sector of the economy but in the hockey rink as part
of the educational program of a major university.").
63 See id. at 304 (explaining that NCAA's amateurism rules had legitimate goals that
had been in effect since founding of the NCAA, and were not put in place with desire to
reduce any student's access to intercollegiate athletics).
64 See id. (noting that even if there are some adverse effects of these rules, they are
only incidental and often necessary for NCAA to accomplish its greater goals).
65 See id. (holding that there was no evidence to show that these rules were initiated
by NCAA in order to create or sustain a monopoly in intercollegiate athletics).
66 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
67 See id. at 1141-42 (explaining that NCAA by-law 12-1 limited number of assistant
football coaches that Division I colleges could have to eight, and number of assistant
basketball coaches that Division I colleges could have to two).
68 See id. at 1142 (stating that Hennessey was assistant coach at University of
Alabama for eighteen years, and that Hudson was assistant coach at Alabama for eight
years).
69 See id. at 1141-42. Both coaches had one-year contracts that were automatically
renewable at the end of the season. Id. at 1142. See id., discussing that while, in the past,
neither coach had a problem getting their contracts renewed, after the by-law was
enacted, their contracts were not renewed because Alabama had too many full time
assistant coaches on its payroll.
70 See id. at 1152 (clarifying that this court has never given NCAA immunity under
Sherman Act).

2006]

THE COMMIMENT TO PARTICIPATE RULE

decide to apply a rule of reason, rather than a per se analysis. 71
In performing its analysis, the court reasoned that even if there
was some economic motive for the bylaw, the driving force was
the improvement of academics. 7 2 The NCAA was attempting to
reign in college athletics and put more of an emphasis on
academics. 73 Because the underlying motive of the restraint here
was largely non-commercial, it was held to be reasonable. 74
The NCAA was also victorious in holding up sanctions against
universities. 75 In Justice v. NCAA, four University of Arizona
football players sued the NCAA regarding television and
postseason bans the NCAA had instituted on Arizona. 76 The
players claimed that the ban was a group boycott and therefore
per se illegal. 77 The court held that the players had not made out
a case on any elements of a group boycott claim.7 8 There was no
purpose to reduce competition by banning Arizona; there was
only a motive to protect amateurism and enhance fair
competition.79 Even though Arizona would not be allowed to
compete with other member institutions, this by-law lacked any
71 See id. ("Given the nature and purposes of the NCAA and its member institutions,
this particular restraint, limiting the number of assistant coaches who may be employed
at any one time by the institutions, is not a per se violation of the antitrust laws.").
72 See id. at 1153 (noting that NCAA by-laws were enacted after lengthy study into
problems of NCAA, and that by-laws were consistent with goal of improving educational
objectives of colleges).
73 See id. (explaining that NCAA was concerned with increasing influence revenues
had on college athletics, and wanted to enact measures which would reign in amount of
money spent to help preserve competition and amateurism).
74 See id. The court stated:
Bylaw 12-1 was, with other rules adopted at the same time, intended to be an
,economy measure'. In this sense it was both in design and effect one having
commercial impact. But the fundamental objective in mind was to preserve and foster
competition in intercollegiate athletics-by curtailing, as it were, potentially
monopolistic practices by the more powerful-and to reorient the programs into their
traditional role as amateur sports operating as part of the educational processes.
Id.
75 See Hawkins v. NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602, 615 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (holding that
sanctions imposed by NCAA are valid); see also Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 383
(D. Ariz. 1983) (upholding sanctions imposed by NCAA).
76 See Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 360 (explaining that NCAA had banned University of
Arizona football team from participating in postseason bowl games for 1983 and 1984
seasons, and also banned any appearances on television for 1984 and 1985 seasons).
77 See id. at 361-63 (discussing plaintiffs' claims that NCAA ruling prevented players
from competing against other schools, and denied them exposure they needed to compete
with other players for professional contracts with NFL).
78 See id. at 379 (explaining that plaintiffs' had put forth no evidence to show that
bans on Arizona were done by NCAA with purpose of lessening competition).
79 See id. (distinguishing these sanctions from other group boycotts in professional
sports by pointing out that these sanctions help promote competition by punishing any
colleges that try to get unfair advantage by breaking NCAA rules).
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restraints on commercial competition, which is needed to find
illegality for group boycotts.SO
Most recently, in Smith v. NCAA,81 the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit upheld an NCAA by-law regarding postbaccalaureate eligibility of student athletes.S2 This by-law
permitted graduate students to participate in intercollegiate
athletics only if they attended the same school in which they did
their undergraduate studies.8 3 The Plaintiff was doing her
graduate work at Hofstra, but was not allowed to play volleyball
there because she had received her undergraduate degree from
St. Bonaventure.8 4 Again looking at the purpose behind the bylaw, the court noted that it was created to promote fair
competition among the schools,8 5 further stating that eligibility
requirements as such do nothing to further any economic
advantages that the NCAA may have.8 6 Due to the fact that

80 See id. at 382 (stating that these sanctions were similar to those in Jones and
Hennessey, and therefore were reasonably related to noncommercial goals of promoting
amateurism).
81 139 F.3d 180, 181 (3d Cir. 1998), vacated, 525 U.S. 459 (1999) (affirming district
court's dismissal of appellant's Sherman Act claim).
82 See Smith, 139 F.3d at 187 (holding that by-laws at issue here clearly survive any
rule of reason analysis).
83 Id. at 184. The NCAA by-law provided:
[a] student-athlete who is enrolled in a graduate or professional school of the
institution he or she previously attended as an undergraduate (regardless of whether
the individual has received a United States baccalaureate degree or its equivalent), a
student-athlete who is enrolled and seeking a second baccalaureate or equivalent
degree at the same institution, or a student-athlete who has graduated and is
continuing as a full-time student at the same institution while taking course work
that would lead to the equivalent of another major or degree as defined and
documented by the institution, may participate in intercollegiate athletics, provided
the student has eligibility remaining and such participation occurs within the
applicable five-year or 10-semester period ....

Id.

84 See id. at 183-84 (noting that plaintiff had participated in intercollegiate volleyball
for only two years at St. Bonaventure, and therefore thought she still had two years of
eligibility remaining, regardless of whether she went to different college).
85 See id. at 185 (stating that this eligibility rule was not related to commercial
activities because it was not enacted to provide NCAA with competitive advantage); see
also Pocono Invitational Sports Camp, Inc. v. NCAA, 317 F. Supp. 2d 569, 583 n.14 (E.D.
Pa. 2004) (noting purpose of eligibility rules is to maintain amateur intercollegiate
athletics as an "integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral
part of the student body," thus maintaining clear distinction between intercollegiate and
professional sports).
86 See Smith, 139 F.3d at 186 (finding no "plainly anticompetitive" effects from NCAA
eligibility requirements); see also Pocono, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 583 (noting that purpose of
eligibility requirements was not to give NCAA a commercial advantage, but rather to
"prevent commercializing influences from destroying the unique 'product' of college
football").
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there were no commercial issues present,87 and the by-law helped
the product of amateur sports to survive, 88 the by-law was found
reasonable.
These cases all highlight one line of judicial reasoning: that
most NCAA controls are looking to promote competition and can
therefore be justified. 89 Also, when the goal of the NCAA is to
protect the educational standards of its members, there should be
very little antitrust scrutiny. 9 0 The largest problem with this
analysis is that most cases are not cut and dry, and the NCAA
always has some economic motives for its by-laws, even if they
are not obvious. 9 1
B. Setbacks for the NCAA
Even though most courts have been lenient in applying
antitrust standards to the NCAA,92 a number of courts have
found antitrust violations in NCAA by-laws. 93 The leading case
87 See Smith, 139 F.3d at 186 (holding that Sherman Act does not apply to NCAA
eligibility requirements because of limited scope that Act has in regulating organizations
with noncommercial objectives); see also Pocono, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 583 (discussing that
purpose of eligibility requirements was not to provide NCAA with commercial advantage).
88 See Smith, 139 F.3d at 187 (explaining potential benefits of this by-law, including
fact that undergraduate students will not forgo opportunities to participate in
intercollegiate athletics because of the chance that they may be able to participate as
graduate students); see also McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344-45 (5th Cir. 1988)
(noting that eligibility rules create NCAA's product and allow for its survival in light of
commercial pressures).
89 See Matthew J. Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulation of "Big Time"
College Athletics: The Need to Shift from Nostalgic 191h and 20 Century Ideals of
Amateurism to the Economic Realities of the 21"t Century, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 4
(2000) (noting that courts have reasoned that most NCAA rules are only ancillary
commercial restraints with main purpose of furthering higher education objectives); see
also Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass'n v. NCAA, 339 F. Supp. 2d 545, 550 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (noting that whether NCAA's restraints are reasonable depends on their effect on
market and their "procompetitive justifications").
90 See Mitten, supra note 89, at 4 (highlighting great deference that courts have given
to NCAA when it can point out legitimate noncommercial objectives); see also Hennessey
v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1153 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting that by-law designed to set cap on
the amount of coaches NCAA members could hire was in line with educational objectives
of member institutions).
91 See Mitten, supra note 89, at 2 (explaining that certain "revenue generating' sports
rule college landscape so much that intercollegiate athletics cannot be considered amateur
educational diversions anymore). See generally Adidas Am., Inc. v. NCAA, 40 F. Supp. 2d
1275, 1286 (D, Kan. 1999) (exploring effect of by-law 12.5.5 on NCAA and its members).
92 See, e.g., Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 748 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (holding that
NCAA eligibility rules against student who declared for NFL draft did not violate
Sherman Act); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975) (holding NCAA
amateurism rules did not violate Sherman Act).
93 See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984)
(holding that NCAA television plan was restraint upon operation of free market); Law v.
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against the NCAA was decided by the Supreme Court in Board of
Regents v. NCAA.94 In that case, the University of Oklahoma and
the University of Georgia sued the NCAA regarding its by-laws
limiting the number of football games that could be televised. 95
The NCAA claimed that the purposes of the restrictions were
to reduce, insofar as possible, the adverse effects of live
television upon football game attendance and, in turn, upon
the athletic and related educational programs dependent
upon the proceeds therefrom; to spread football television
participation among as many colleges as practicable; to
reflect properly the image of universities as educational
institutions; to promote college football through the use of
television, to advance the overall interests of intercollegiate
athletics, and to provide college football television to the
public to the extent compatible with these other objectives. 9 6
The Court did not find any pro-competitive justifications for
these rules. 9 7 There was clear evidence that prices and output
were being restrained. 98 Under a free market system that
allowed schools to contract for television rights, there would be
many more games broadcast and therefore lead to more revenues
for each school. 99 The NCAA was not able to show how this plan
would lead to an equalization of competition that would benefit
college football as a whole.lOO For those foregoing reasons, the
NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th Cir. 1998) (barring NCAA from reenacting
compensation limits for certain coaches).
94 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
95 See id. at 92-94. The plan had evolved over 30 years to become fairly complex at
the time of trial. The essential elements of the plan were that a school could appear on
television no more than six times in a given year and no more than four times on national
television in a given year. Id. at 94. See id., noting there were also limits on the total
amount of games that each network could televise in a given year.
96 Id. at 92 n.6.
97 See id. at 115-17. The Court rejected numerous defenses by the NCAA for its bylaws. Id. at 116-17. They included: the need to protect attendance at live games,
protecting a competitive balance between all amateur athletic teams throughout the
country, and maximizing consumer demand for the product of college football. Id.
98 See id. at 116 (noting that individual schools are not being helped by restrictions
since there will always be some game televised while a live event is going on).
99 See id. at 119-20 (explaining that best way to increase competitive balance is to let
schools enjoy higher revenues from greater exposure to television, and then reinvest those
monies back into their programs).
100 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117-18 (1984). The
Court stated:
The NCAA does not claim that its television plan has equalized or is intended to
equalize competition within any one league. The plan is nationwide in scope and
there is no single league or tournament in which all college football teams compete.
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Court found the broadcast restrictions to be unlawful under rule
of reason analysis.101
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
struck down NCAA by-laws in Law v. NCAA.102 Plaintiffs, two
part-time college basketball coaches,1 0 3 challenged an NCAA bylaw that limited the salaries of others in their position. 104 The
stated purpose behind the rule was to stabilize the costs of
athletics while still promoting a balance in competition10 5 in the
wake of Title IX.106 The court determined that these possible
benefits were insufficient to outweigh the restraints that resulted
from the basic price fixing scheme at work. 107 Behind some of the
non-commercial justifications for the law, there existed the real
purposes of cost saving and increased profitability.1OS Though
companies are allowed to strive for higher profits, that goal alone
is not a justification for restraints on price or output.109
These cases look past the proffered motives of the NCAA to
locate its true hidden desires.110 These cases have removed some
There is no evidence of any intent to equalize the strength of teams in Division I-A
with those in Division II or Division III, and not even a colorable basis for giving
colleges that have no football program at all a voice in the management of the
revenues generated by the football programs at other schools.
Id.
101 See id. at 120 (clarifying that even though role of NCAA is to preserve tradition of
amateurism, rules that restrict output do not coincide with this role).
102 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
103 See id. at 1015 (explaining that plaintiffs were part-time basketball coaches at
Division I colleges, and therefore fell under scope of restricted-earnings coach rule).
104 See id. at 1014 (stating that NCAA by-law limited salaries of restricted-earnings
coaches in all intercollegiate sports other than football to only $16,000 per year).
105 See id. (noting that NCAA determined that $16,000 annual salary was equivalent
to tuition reimbursement that a graduate assistant would be paid if he had job of a
restricted-earnings coach).
106 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2005). The pertinent portion of Title IX with respect to
extracurricular activities states that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .... " Id.
107 See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that even though
NCAA has accomplished its goals of lowering costs, REC Rule was horizontal price
restraint which is completely anticompetitive).
108 See id. at 1022 (highlighting NCAA's goal of eliminating price competition of
assistant coaches in order to keep costs down, thereby increasing profits for each school).
109 See id. at 1023. The court stated "While increasing output, creating operating
efficiencies, making a new product available, enhancing product or service quality, and
widening consumer choice have been accepted by courts as justifications for otherwise
anticompetitive agreements, mere profitability or cost savings have not qualified as a
defense under the antitrust laws." Id.
110 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 115-17 (1984) (noting that the Court
rejected proffered defenses of NCAA); see also Gregory M. Krakau, Monopoly and Other
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of the arrogance that the NCAA has displayed over the years,
believing itself immune from antitrust scrutiny."' It appears
courts have begun to recognize that the NCAA is no longer a nonprofit entity, and is thus deserving of more scrutiny. Such
heightened review is appropriate because the NCAA has
structured itself in a manner to generate greater profits.112
C. The NCAA: Model Educator or Fortune 500 Company?
Since its inception, the NCAA has claimed that its main goals
are to promote education and amateurism. 1 13 Accordingly, the
mission statement of the NCAA states that it "strives to
maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the
educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the
student body."114 To promote education, the NCAA requires
minimum test scores and grades in order to compete in
intercollegiate athletics.11 5 As part of its plan to promote
amateurism, the NCAA bans the paying of student athletes.116
The NCAA argues that even though collegiate sports have
become a billion-dollar industry, the NCAA has fought these
developments every step of the way, and is still in the best
Children's Games: NCAA's Antitrust Suit Woes Threaten Its Existence, 61 OHIO ST. L.J.
399, 429-30 (2000) (explaining that courts have become more aware of NCAA plans, which
involve restraints on price and output).
111 See Andrew Bagnato, NCAA Finishes Off a Moving Experience, CHI. TRIB., July
27, 1999, at 4, (commenting on "trademark arrogance" of NCAA); see also Krakau, supra
note 110, at 438-40 (identifying several instances in past when NCAA refused to settle
potential antitrust cases because it believed that it was under cloak of immunity from
traditional Sherman Act scrutiny).
112 See Kevin E. Broyles, NCAA Regulation of IntercollegiateAthletes: Time for a New
Game Plan, 46 ALA. L. REV. 487, 493 (1995) (noting that NCAA's operation resembles that
of a corporation); see also Konsky, supra note 4, at 1582 (detailing transformation of
NCAA from small rule-making organization to that of a large structure that resembles a
corporation).
113 See Konsky, supra note 4, at 1584 (listing regulations that NCAA has enacted to
protect amateurism, including limitations on grants to athletes, prohibitions of athletes
holding jobs, and stopping eligibility once athletes hire an agent); see also Manual, supra
note 1 (stating basic purpose of NCAA which is to ensure that athletics is an integral part
of the educational system while still retaining clear distinction between intercollegiate
athletics and professional sports).
114 See Konsky, supra note 4, at 1582.
115 See id. at 1583 (explaining that once in college, student-athletes must take a
minimum number of credits in order to be able to compete in athletics); see also Manual,
supra note 1 (detailing requirements to remain in good academic standing).
116 See Konsky, supra note 4, at 1584 (stating that colleges are not allowed to pay
their student-athletes, even ones who participate in certain revenue generating sports);
see also Manual, supra note 1 (describing various forms of prohibited pay).
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position to promote academics and amateurism in the face of all
the non-amateur influences. 117
In addition, the NCAA claims that it is not a professional
corporation, but rather a voluntary association. 11 8 By describing
itself in those terms, the NCAA tries to paint a picture of an
ethical charitable organization, seeking only fair play with little
to no interest in commercial dealings.119 Therefore, the NCAA
argues that it is not the type of organization that the Sherman
20
Act was designed to protect against.1
There are several problems with the academic, not-for-profit
image that the NCAA attempts to project. The NCAA would like
to describe the model student-athlete as one "who engages in a
particular sport for the educational, physical, mental and social
benefits he derives therefrom and to whom participation in that
sport is an avocation." 12 1 Unfortunately, but truthfully, the
model student athlete may also be the one who draws thousands

117 See Lisa M. Bianchi & Bryan S. Gadol, When Playing the Game of College Sports,
You Should Not be Playing "Monopoly," 1 CHAP. L. REV. 151, 155-56 (1998) (noting that
NCAA had enacted regulations which have cost colleges millions of dollars in revenues in
order to promote its ideals); Michael B. LiCalsi, Case Note, 'he Whole Situation is a
Shame, Baby!"- NCAA Self-Regulations Categorized as Horizontal Combinations Under
the Sherman Act's Rule of Reason Standard: Unreasonable Restraints of Trade or an
Unfair Judicial Test?, 12 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 831, 865 (2004) (positing that "[tlhere is
...little doubt that the NCAA could ensure higher profits for the nation's more popular
athletic programs if it wished to do so").
118 See Note, Sherman Act Invalidationof the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1299, 1305 (1992) [hereinafter Sherman Act Invalidation] (noting that NCAA defines
itself as a voluntary association, and therefore many judges have said that it is not their
business to determine rules for it); see also NCAA v. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77, 83-84 (Ky.
2001) (stating that members of voluntary associations "should be allowed to 'paddle their
own canoe' without unwarranted interference from the courts").
119 See Sherman Act Invalidation, supra note 118, at 1305 (explaining that NCAA
sees its regulations as necessary in order to maintain traditional amateur athletics); see
also Gordon E. Gouveia, Note, Making a Mountain Out of a Mogul: Jeremy Bloom v.
NCAA and Unjustified Denial of Compensation under NCAA Amateurism Rules, 6 VAND.
J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 22, 23 (quoting NCAA's stated purpose to ensure that "athletic
activities... may be maintained on an ethical plane in keeping with the dignity and high
purpose of education").
120 See Sherman Act Invalidation, supra note 118, at 1306 (discussing NCAA
arguments that its actions are pro-competitive because they protect the product of college
sports); see also Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 561 P.2d 499, 506 (Okla.
1977) (determining whether NCAA was the type of organization Sherman Act was
designed to protect against).
121 See John Scanlan, Antitrust-The Emerging Legal Issue, 61 IND. L. J. 1, 2 (1985)
(quoting NCAA's Constitution); see also Philip J. Closius, Hell Hath No Fury Like A Fan
Scorned: State Regulation of Sports Agents, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 511-12 (1999) (noting
that NCAA has "publicly nurtured ideal of 'amateur student-athlete"' and created rules to
prevent students from receiving benefit from their athletic talent while they remain
amateurs).
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of fans into an arena, and millions to their television sets. 12 2 The
athlete who is cheered for winning the Heisman Trophy does not
receive the same accolades as the student who is garnering
excellent grades in the classroom.12 3 In today's world, amateur
sports have become a business.12 4 The abilities and talents of
student athletes are the product that the NCAA sells to a widely
competitive television market.12 5
The notion of amateurism is surely moribund, if not dead in
the area of "big time" college athletics.12 6 This area includes
men's college basketball and football, where schools have become
"farm systems" for the professional leagues.12 7 With so much
money at stake, 12 8 the NCAA basically functions as an economic
122 See Scanlan, supra note 121, at 3 (explaining that amateur sports are a highly
valued commodity, and generate millions of dollars per year because spectators value
watching these pure sporting events); see also Christian Dennie, Amateurism Stifles a
Student-Athlete's Dream, 12 SPORTS LAW. J. 221, 221 (2005) (arguing that NCAA profits
unfairly from the hard work and sweat of student-athletes).
123 See Scanlan, supra note 121, at 3 (detailing story of Doug Flutie, who was
awarded Heisman Trophy in 1985 on live television and thereafter signed $6 million
contract with NFL to play quarterback); see also Jeffrey M. Waller, Article, A Necessary
Evil: Proposition16 and Its Impact on Academics and Athletics in the NCAA, 1 DEPAUL J.
SPORTS L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 189-90 (2003) (stating that "while each school generally
includes a minimum score requirement among its evaluation criteria, a low score is not
always a death sentence, particularly for student-athletes").
124 See Scanlan, supra note 121, at 3 (stating that "amateur sports in many important
respects is a business, a highly specialized industry which converts the raw material of
athletic skill into a product which is customarily sold in the competitive television
market"); see also Rodney K. Smith, The National CollegiateAthletic Association's Death
Penalty: How Educators Punish Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L. J. 985, 994 (1987)
(recognizing characterizations of intercollegiate sports as "big business masquerading as
an educational enterprise").
125 See Scanlan, supra note 121, at 3 (noting that Supreme Court has treated NCAA
like any business in reviewing its television contracts in Board of Regents); see also
Dennie, supra note 122, at 221-23 (arguing that NCAA has benefited from hard work of
athletes and "advent of television and media outlets").
126 See Mitten, supra note 89, at 2 (arguing that NCAA's idealistic goals are difficult
to live up to in modern era of college athletics); John G. Weistart, Gender & Sports:
Setting a Course for College Athletics: Can Gender Equity Find a Place in Commercialized
College Sports?, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLY 191, 211-12 (describing incredible amounts
of money now involved in intercollegiate sports).
127 See Bianchi, supra note 117, at 152 (arguing that colleges compensate athletes by
providing scholarships and acting as de facto farm systems to push players toward
professional careers); Mitten, supra note 89, at 2 (explaining that athletes who participate
in Division I basketball and football are much more interested in developing their games
for professional leagues, rather that trying to make the most out of their education).
128 See David W. Woodburn, College Athletes Should be Entitled to Worker's
Compensation for Sports-Related Injuries: A Request to Broaden the Definition of
Employee Under Ohio Revised Code Section 4123.01, 28 AKRON L. REV. 611, 611 (1995)
(showing data of several contracts that NCAA has made with television networks,
including $1 billion contract with CBS and $38 million contract between Notre Dame and
NBC); see also Laura Freedman, Note, Pay or Play? The Jeremy Bloom Decision and
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cartel, regulating just how much the free market can enter into
college athletics.129 The power that this cartel wields can be seen
in the fact that no college chooses to go out on its own. 130 "[T]here
is an economic necessity to remain a part of this national
organization to reap the economic rewards of 'big-time' college
sports."131

For years, the NCAA successfully argued that its restraints
were needed to maintain a competitive balance in college
athletics.13 2 Recent history, however, illustrates that the removal
of some of its restraints has actually helped the competitive
balance.13 3 An examination of the effects of Board of Regents, for
example, demonstrates that the removal of television restrictions
has greatly helped colleges in smaller markets.13 4 Smaller
colleges have been able to contract for regional television deals,
increasing their exposure to the local viewing area. 13 5 This
NCAA Amateurism Rules, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 694
(describing NCAA's various television contracts, including a $6.3 billion deal with CBS).
129 See Mitten, supra note 89, at 3 (discussing role of NCAA members as "economic
competitors that collectively possess monopsony power over the demand for college
football and basketball players and monopoly power over the supply of college football and
basketball games"); see also James V. Koch, The Economic Realities of Amateur Sports
Organization,61 IND. L.J. 9, 15-16 (defining NCAA as an economic cartel).
130 See Mitten, supra note 89, at 3 (noting that even though colleges may gain some
competitive advantage by disobeying NCAA rules, there must be some reason why no
college chooses to follow this path); see also Broyles, supra note 112, at 491-94 (describing
incredible power NCAA holds over colleges).
131 See Mitten, supra note 89, at 3 (explaining benefits of belonging to NCAA); see
also Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 561 P.2d 499, 505 (Okla. 1977) (stating
that it is "economic necessity" for member schools to belong to NCAA).
132 See, e.g., Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that NCAA
by-laws regulating assistant coaches did not violate Sherman Act); Gaines v. NCAA, 746
F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (holding that NCAA eligibility rules against student who
declared for NFL draft did not violate Sherman Act); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1975) (holding NCAA amateurism rules did not violate Sherman Act).
133 See Scully, supra note 47, at 885-86 (discussing how unrestrained regional
markets have helped small college basketball teams become more nationally competitive
by enhancing regional appeal); see also William Taaffe, Too Much of a Good Thing,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 15, 1984, at 78-79 (noting that basketball is essentially a
regional interest sport).
134 See Scully, supra note 47, at 884 n.170 (providing example that "in the first year
of increased regional broadcasts... Brigham Young, a lesser known school that played in
a relatively weak conference with only a regional following, was able to climb to the top of
the wire service polls and win the national championship"); see also Fred Barbash,
Supreme Court Breaks NCAA Hold on Televised College Football Games, WASH. POST,
June 28, 1984, at Al (reporting that more games of local and regional interest were able
to be broadcast after NCAA restraints were lifted).
135 See Scully, supra note 47, at 886 (explaining that regional coverage will give
smaller schools opportunity to be regularly seen on television, something that did not
exist under NCAA's national television plans); see also Barbash, supra note 134, at Al
(stating that local stations have freedom to negotiate for games not already booked by
national networks).
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greater exposure has helped them "draw more spectators, retain
more local talent, and thus become more competitive
36

nationally."1

III. THE NCAA SHOULD GET SLAM

A.

DUNKED BY THE COURTS

Violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act

Section 1 of the Sherman Act governs concerted action by
multiple firms.1 37 Section 2 governs the conduct of a single
firm.1 38 Courts have consistently evaluated the conduct of the
NCAA under § 1.139 Even though one could argue that the NCAA
is a single firm, it is actually made up of many schools that are in
competition with one another.140 Decisions are made by a vote by
all the member institutions. 14 1 Thus, actions by the NCAA can be
properly judged to be horizontal restraints on competition.14 2
As stated earlier in this Note, the NCAA has traditionally been
subject to review under the rule of reason, 143 even though other
136 Scully, supra note 47, at 886.
137 See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) (stating that
distinction between concerted and independent action is not always clear to parties or
courts); see also Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984)
(explaining that Sherman Act makes a distinction between concerted and independent
action).
138 See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761 (positing that, under Sherman Act, a single entity
has the right to deal, or refuse to deal, with whomever it likes, as long as it does so
independently); see also Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767 (discussing the fact that a single
firm cannot be prosecuted for unreasonably restraining commerce, because firms do have
right to seek profits).
139 See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984)
(holding that actions of NCAA can be considered horizontal restraints); Law v. NCAA, 134
F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998) (analyzing NCAA conduct under § 1 of Sherman Act).
140 See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 99 (noting that NCAA schools compete against
each other in attracting television revenues, support of fans, and best athletes); Chicago
Prof l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 601 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that "[t]he
colleges which made up the NCAA were entirely separate economic entities, competing
with each other in many areas .... ").
141 See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 99 (explaining that final regulations enacted by
NCAA are determined by vote of all members); Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782, 797
n.32 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (describing how NCAA members have organized a constitution, bylaws, and regulations to guide in decisions such as eligibility criteria).
142 See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 99-100 (finding that NCAA restrictions
amounted to horizontal price fixing); Law, 134 F.3d at 1018 (recognizing that some
horizontal restraints serve pro-competitive purpose of making college sports available).
143 See, e.g., Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that NCAA
by-laws should be analyzed under rule of reason); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738
(M.D. Tenn. 1990) (holding that NCAA eligibility rules against student who declared for
the NFL draft should be judged under rule of reason analysis).
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144
areas of sports have had group boycotts judged per se illegal.
Under traditional rule of reason analysis, the MIBA must show
adverse effects on competition because of NCAA actions.14 5 The
MIBA must show more than mere harm to itself, because
competition as a whole must be adversely affected.1 46 The most
harmful effect on competition is the lack of choice that colleges
have for postseason play. 14 7 Though this may not greatly affect
the 'power schools' of college basketball, it can have a large effect
on smaller schools. 148 The prime example is the young,
inexperienced team who barely makes it into the NCAA
Tournament,1 49 and will probably play only one game before
having its season end abruptly.1 50 By not having an option to
play in the NIT, a team such as this is unable to make a long run
in the tournament, generating more fan interest and gaining
important experience for the athletes.151 Also, because the NIT
144 See, e.g., M & H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 560 F. Supp. 591 (D. Mass.
1983), rev'd, 733 F.2d 973 (1st Cir. 1984). The court stated that "[t]he evidence
demonstrates, therefore, that a group of purchasers combined with two track promoters
and a tire company to fix the maximum price of tires by eliminating competition from
other sellers. I rule that this combination is in fact 'within the undeniably anticompetitive per se boycott paradigm."' Id. at 602.
145 See K.M.B. Warehouse Distrib. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1995)
(explaining that plaintiffs must show adverse effects on competition in whole relevant
market); Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543
(2d Cir. 1993) (stating that plaintiff bears initial burden of showing that challenged action
has had actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in relevant market).
146 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (holding that
Sherman Act was designed to protect competition, not competitors); Capital, 996 F.2d at
543 (explaining that requirement of proving harm to whole market "fulfills the broad
purpose of the antitrust law that was enacted to ensure competition in general, not
narrowly focused to protect individual competitors").
147 See Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass'n v. NCAA, 339 F. Supp. 2d 545, 551
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that 'Commitment to Participate Rule' basically forces schools to
boycott NIT if chosen to play in NCAA Tournament).
148 See id. at 551 (explaining that low seeded teams in NCAA Tournament may want
to choose NIT instead).
149 See id. at 551 (noting that low seeded schools rarely advance past first round of
NCAA Tournament, and therefore those schools are not able to develop much postseason
experience); Jeff Zillgitt, Don't Go Overboard With Upset Picks in NCAA Pool, USA
TODAY, Mar. 16, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sportslcolumnistlzillgitt/
2005-03-16-zillgitt x.htm (noting that it is rare for a number 6 or lower seed to make it to
the Final Four).
150 See Metro., 339 F. Supp. 2d at 551 (identifying fact that schools which exit early
from NCAA Tournament are not allowed to then participate in NIT if they want to get
more postseason experience); Mark Alesia, Antitrust Case Puts NCAA on Defense: NIT
Suit Over Tournament Will go to Court Monday, INDYSTAR, July 31, 2005, http://www.
indystar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050731/SPORTS/507310500 (noting that even
if NIT postponed its tournament until after NCAA's Tournament, teams that participated
in NCAA would still not be allowed to participate in NIT's tournament).
151 See Metro., 339 F. Supp. 2d at 551 (stating that "facts tend to show that the
Postseason Rules adversely affect competition by depriving colleges and fans of a
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allows schools to host some of the early games on their home
campuses, the NCAA restrictions prevent these schools from
152
earning added revenues from ticket sales of NIT games.
If the MIBA proves these anticompetitive effects, the burden
shifts to the NCAA to prove pro-competitive benefits of its
rule.153 The NCAA puts forth two main justifications for the rule.
First, it argues, as it has in the past, that it wants to limit the
amount of tournaments that colleges participate in to keep the
focus on academics. 1 54 This was based on NCAA studies that took
place in the 1980's which stated that the amount of time student
athletes devoted to basketball interfered with the academic
demands of college.155 By limiting the amount of tournaments
that colleges can participate in, the NCAA can cut down on
multiple time commitments, including practice, travel and actual
game play.15 6 The second justification of the NCAA is that the
rule is necessary to maintain the legitimacy of the NCAA
championship.1 5 7 If one of the best teams in a given year chooses
potentially attractive postseason tournament choice and possible participation in an
additional tournament"); see also Tom Verducci, et al., Scorecard, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Apr. 8, 2002, at 25 (discussing how wins in post-season tournaments generate fan
interest).
152 See Metro., 339 F. Supp. 2d at 551 (relaying opinions of two Division I coaches
who said they would consider playing in NIT if NCAA rules were changed to allow NIT to
be more competitive); Nat'l Invitational Tournament Post-Season Overview, http:/www.
nit.org/main.cfm?areaid=130 (last visited Dec. 22, 2005) (stating that "[t]he opening
rounds of the tournament were ...moved from New York to campus sites in 1977").
153 See K.M.B. Warehouse Distrib. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1995)
(explaining that once plaintiff shows anticompetitive effects, burden then shifts to
defendant); Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass'n v. NCAA, 339 F. Supp 2d 545, 571
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that if "plaintiff carries its burden, the burden shifts [back] to the
defendant").
154 See Metro., 339 F. Supp. 2d at 548 (noting that NCAA argues that "End of Playing
Season Rule protects the welfare of student athletes because it prevents coaches from
forcing their teams to play and practice all year long"); see also Worldwide Basketball and
Sports Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, No. 2:00-CV-1439, 2002 WL 32137511, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July
19, 2002) (arguing that limiting amount of tournaments schools can participate in will
help cure any interference with academics).
155 See Worldwide, 2002 WL 32137511, at *2 (detailing study which claimed demands
on athletes in basketball and football adversely affected classroom performance and
graduation rates); Brit Kirwan, Ohio State President Thinks Time is Right for Meaningful
Reform, NCAA NEWS (January 21, 2002), http://www.ncaa.org/news/2002/20020121/active
/3902n22.html (noting recent report which found poor classroom performance and
"excessive out-of-class demands" on student athletes).
156 See Worldwide, 2002 WL 32137511, at *2 (identifying certain benefits of reduced
participation in basketball tournaments); University of Maryland, Academic Integrity in
IntercollegiateAthletics: Principles, Rules, and Best Practices,§ 4, http://www.math.umd.
edu/-jmc/COIA/A4.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2005) (noting that missed class days are
inevitable with travel time and tournament play).
157 See Metro., 339 F. Supp. 2d at 552 (explaining NCAA's argument that number of
postseason championships should be limited to only one); see also Mark Alesia, NIT Will
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not to participate, then there will always be questions as to
whether a 'true champion' had been crowned.158 It would appear
that the NCAA shoots itself in the foot with this justification.159
While proclaiming the need for the rule to create a legitimate
championship, the NCAA also notes that no team has chosen the
NIT over the NCAA since 1970.160 Also, the NCAA often bans
schools from competing in postseason tournaments, which would
give rise to the same legitimacy concerns as a school's
participation in the NIT.161 Therefore, the NCAA helps to make
MIBA's argument that there is no need for the rule simply
because the evidence shows that the NCAA should have no
worries that a school will choose the NIT over the NCAA
Tournament. 162
Giving the NCAA the benefit of the doubt, and assuming
that limiting the amount of games played is a legitimate
justification, the MIBA must then show less restrictive means for
the NCAA to accomplish its goals.1 63 It would appear that
limiting the amount of games in which teams play can be
accomplished by a less restrictive rule, because the NCAA can
Battle NCAA in Court-Maybe on it; Both Sides Confident as Basketball Tournament
Debate Heads for Trial in July, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 13, 2005, at 1D (discussing
NCAA's argument on why there should be one tournament).
158 See Metro., 339 F. Supp. 2d at 552 (noting that NCAA argues that only one team
should be crowned national champion in each sport); see also Alesia supra note 157, at 1D
(stating that NCAA provides a service by establishing a single national champion).
159 See Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass'n v. NCAA, 339 F. Supp 2d 545, 552
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (detailing NCAA's alternative argument that its rule may in fact be
unnecessary).
160 See Metro., 339 F. Supp. 2d at 552 (noting that the last school to choose NIT over
NCAA was University of Marquette in 1970); see also Big East Profiles: Marquette,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Aug. 28, 2005, at 5K (discussing Marquette's choice to play in NIT
over NCAA).
161 See Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 360 (D. Ariz. 1983). The NCAA instituted
a ban against the University of Arizona prohibiting its football team from competing in
postseason competitions for 1983 and 1984 seasons. Id. The NCAA also banned Jackson
State University's track team from post-season competition for two years. See Jackson
State U. Teams Punished by NCAA, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, June 2,
2000, at A55.
162 See Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass'n v. NCAA, 339 F. Supp 2d 545, 552
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting contradiction that NCAA creates when it argues that the rule has
never been violated in over 30 years, but that it is still necessary anyway); see also Big
East Profiles, supra note 160, at 5K (explaining that the last team to pick NIT over NCAA
did so because it was upset with NCAA).
163 See NHL Players' Ass'n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d 712, 719 (6th
Cir. 2003) (stating that if defendant "is able to demonstrate pro-competitive effects, the
plaintiff then must show that any legitimate objectives can be achieved in a substantially
less restrictive manner"); K.M.B. Warehouse Distrib. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127
(2d Cir. 1995) (stating that burden shifts back to plaintiffs once defendants can prove procompetitive justifications).
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eliminate the 'Commitment to Participate' and just enforce the
rule limiting participation to only one postseason tournament.
Therefore, schools would be allowed a choice as to which
tournament they want to play in, while still not forcing their
athletes to play in too many games. This accomplishes the
NCAA's goals of promoting academics, while removing any
boycott on the Postseason NIT. Because the MIBA can prove less
restrictive means, it should be able to meet its burden of proof,
and the NCAA should be in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
B. Violations of § 2 of the Sherman Act
In order to prevail under § 2, the MIBA must prove two things.
First, that the NCAA has monopoly power, 164 and second, that
there was "willful acquisition and maintenance" of that monopoly
power by the NCAA.165 Market power can be proven by showing
that the NCAA has a large enough share of the relevant
market. 166 The MIBA argues that the relevant market is
7
"Division I men's college basketball postseason tournaments." 16
There is considerable value to this argument.
The NCAA
Tournament is the showcase of college basketball, a sport unique
from its professional counterparts, as fans often tune in to watch
the purity of young student athletes who give it their all without
being paid millions of dollars. 168 'March Madness' has become the
marquee event of the spring, with millions watching on their
televisions or otherwise, and filling out their office pools. This
attraction, and the unique characteristics of 'March Madness,'
164 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966) (stating that the
first element is "the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market"); see also
Metro., 339 F. Supp 2d at 550 (stating that MIBA must first demonstrate that NCAA's
actions have had substantial adverse effects on competition).
165 See Grinnell, 384 U.S at 570-71 (stating that the second element is "the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as
a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident"); see also
Metro., 339 F. Supp. 2d at 551 (stating that MIBA must prove that challenged restraints
are not reasonably necessary to achieve pro-competitive justifications).
166 See Grinnell, 384 U.S at 571 (discussing some examples of market share); see also
United States v. Visa, 344 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that presence of monopoly
power can be presumed if it can be proven that defendants have an extremely large share
of relevant market).
167 Metro., 339 F. Supp. 2d at 549.
168 See Scanlan, supra note 121, at 3 (explaining that amateur sports are a highly
valued commodity, and generate millions of dollars per year); see also Matisik, supra note
3 (explaining explosion in interest in NCAA Tournament over the past 15 years).

2006]

THE COMMITMENT TO PARTICIPATE RULE

prevents any other event from becoming a true substitute for
postseason college basketball. 169
With the relevant market defined, the MIBA has made
compelling arguments as to the power that the NCAA wields in
said market. MIBA's expert, Professor Noll, calculated NCAA
control over postseason tournaments in 2002.170 The NCAA had
"over seventy percent of attendance, over ninety percent of game
revenues, over ninety-eight percent of total revenues and over
ninety-nine percent of television revenues." 17 1 These large
percentages give rise to the presumption that the NCAA
possesses monopoly power.172
'Willful acquisition and maintenance" of monopoly power can
be shown by evidence of exclusion.17 3 The NCAA must prove that
its dominance of postseason college basketball did not result from
any unlawful practices.1 74 The history of the rivalry between the
NCAA and MIBA shows that this is not so. During the 1950's,
both tournaments were in fierce competition, with many
observers proclaiming the NIT to be more prestigious.1 75 Many

169 See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571 (explaining that analysis of the product market
involves inquiry as to whether substitutes exist which people will use if the main product
becomes undesirable); see also Metro., 339 F. Supp. 2d at 550 (explaining that for
antitrust cases, the relevant market "comprises products that consumers view as
,reasonably interchangeable' with the product which the defendant sells").
170 Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass'n v. NCAA, 339 F. Supp 2d 545, 550
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (explaining Professor Noll's statistics based on analyses of revenues of
both Postseason NIT and NCAA tournaments for the 1992 season).
171 Id. at 550.
172 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (noting that the
company did not hesitate to "wield" their monopoly power); see also United States v. Visa,
344 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that presence of monopoly power can be
presumed if it can be proven that defendants have extremely large share of relevant
market).
173 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945)
(stating that some exclusionary conduct must be shown in order to prove monopolization);
see also Patterson v. United States, 222 F. 599, 620 (6th Cir. 1915) (explaining that in
"perfect" monopoly there is exclusion of all persons but one).
174 See Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 429-30 (noting that it would be unjust to punish
large companies who have performed no unlawful conduct); see also Metro., 339 F. Supp.
2d at 550 (stating that once MIBA meets its initial burden, NCAA must provide a procompetitive justification for challenged restraints).
175 See Matisik, supra note 3 (explaining that competition started between the
tournaments as soon as NCAA Tournament was founded in 1939, and noting, in early
years, NIT was considered the elder tournament which drew better schools to participate);
see also NCAA purchases NIT for $56.5 million CBS SPORTSLINE, (August 17, 2005),
available at http://cbs.sportsline.com/collegebasketball/story/8745007 (distinguishing NIT
as a year older and at one time the bigger event of the two tournaments).
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schools turned down the NCAA for the NIT.176 However, the
NCAA started to flex the muscle it had as the rulemaking body of
college sports. 17 7 It began to expand the number of teams in its
tournament, from the original number of 8 to the current number
of 65.178 It also added rules requiring schools to participate in
only one tournament, which helped force the NIT into the
background.179 The final salvo of the 'Commitment to Participate
Rule' put the nail in the coffin for the NIT.180 As a result of the
foregoing evidence, the NCAA cannot justify that a monopoly was
thrust upon itself.1s1 History shows that the NCAA has
consciously enacted rules over the past 50 years to turn the NIT
from a worthy competitor to the afterthought that it is today. 182
Since the NCAA has the requisite market power and intent to
176 See Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass'n v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563, 566
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that "[u]ntil 1953, NCAA members who received an invitation to
both tournaments could choose to participate in both."); see also Matisik, supra note 3
(claiming schools would choose to play in both tournaments rather than avoiding
participation in NIT).
177 See Metro, 337 F.Supp.2d at 566 (discussing MIBA's claims that NCAA enacted
various regulations to destroy Postseason NIT); see also Symposium, supra note 7, at 428
(noting that because NCAA did not like that NIT was a bigger tournament and did not
like the competition, NCAA passed a rule that if a team was invited to participate in the
NCAA Tournament, said team was not allowed to participate in any other post-season
tournament).
178 See Metro, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 567 (stating that NCAA Tournament expanded to 48
teams in 1980, and then to 64 teams in 1985); see also Matisik, supra note 3 (commenting
that "the NIT has lost much of its prestige during the past 30 years as the NCAA
tournament expanded from 8 teams to its current 65-team field ... ").
179 See Metro, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 566 (stating that "[iun 1953, the NCAA adopted a
rule which prohibited NCAA member institutions from participating in more than one
postseason tournament (the 'One Postseason Tournament Rule')"); see also Matisik, supra
note 3 (noting that "[t]he NCAA also adopted the so-called "One Postseason Tournament
Rule" which prohibits any NCAA member institution from competing in more than one
post-regular season tournament, thereby preventing any school from duplicating CCNY's
1950 double-championship season").
180 See Metro, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 567 (explaining that 'Commitment to Participate
Rule' was enacted in 1981 and evolved out of earlier Expected Participation Rule); see also
Matisik, supra note 3 (stating that according to "the 'Commitment to Participate Rule'
(CPR), if a team at NCAA-member school is invited to participate in a NCAA post-season
tournament, that team must participate in that tournament or it may not participate in
any post-season tournament whatsoever").
181 See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 390 (1956)
(explaining that an exception to Sherman Act prohibitions on monopoly power is taken
when monopoly is "thrust upon" defendant); see also United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (1945) (creating possible defense to § 2 of Sherman Act if
defendants can prove that a monopoly had been thrust upon them).
182 See Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass'n v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563, 566
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (proposing that "several statements by NCAA officials found in NCAA
meeting minutes from the 1940's, 50's and 60's, support its theory that the NCAA adopted
the challenged rules and expanded its Tournament in order to disadvantage the
Postseason NIT"); see also Matisik, supra note 3 (stating that college basketball fans often
forget about NIT while NCAA Tournament is going on).
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monopolize, it should be found to be in violation of § 2 of the
Sherman Act.
IV. A ROADMAP FOR THE FUTURE
The NCAA is no stranger to antitrust scrutiny by the courts, 18 3
but all of the scrutiny unfortunately led to confusion over where
the law stands today.' 8 4 Courts have struggled over how to
evaluate the NCAA as it has transformed in recent years into
more of a commercial entity.18 5 The aftermath of Board of
Regents has led many to believe that only NCAA regulations with
86
commercial undertones will be subject to antitrust scrutiny.1
The problem is that the NCAA has evolved to the point where all
of its activity has distinctively commercial earmarks.187
The courts must come to grips with the fact that the NCAA is
now a commercial enterprise.188 The enormous revenues that the
183 See, e.g., Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1154 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that
NCAA by-laws should be analyzed under rule of reason); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp.
738, 746 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (holding that NCAA eligibility rules against a student who
declared for the NFL draft should be judged under rule of reason analysis).
184 See Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975) (holding that Sherman
Act does not apply to NCAA eligibility standards); see also Note, Sherman Act
Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1299, 1301 (1992) (noting
numerous inconsistent rulings in antitrust cases involving the NCAA).
185 See Stephanie M. Greene, Regulating the NCAA: Making the Calls Under the
Sherman Antitrust Act and Title IX, 52 ME. L. REV. 81, 95 (2000) (concluding that "[tihe
coaches' successful challenge [in Law] should send a clear message to the NCAA that any
regulations that have commercial overtones will not stand up to Sherman Antitrust
analysis"); see also Konsky, supra note 4, at 1589 (detailing gradual shift of NCAA into a
major commercial entity).
186 See Krakau, supra note 110, at 406 (noting that because of Board of Regents,
"[tihe application of antitrust laws to the NCAA not only comports with the plain
language of the Sherman Act and recognizes the revenue-maximizing goals of the NCAA,
but also provides a key check on the organization's power, which would otherwise be
effectively limitless"); see also Konsky, supra note 4, at 1589 (explaining that Board of
Regents helped to forever end the debate that NCAA was immune to antitrust scrutiny).
187 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.22 (1984) (determining that
"the NCAA and its member institutions are in fact organized to maximize revenues"); see
also Scanlan, supra note 121, at 3 (suggesting that the pure amateur sports model that
NCAA puts forth was created to increase popularity and therefore revenue of college
sports).
188 See Lindsay J. Rosenthal, From Regulating Organization to Multi-Billion Dollar
Business: The NCAA is Commercializing the Amateur Competition it has Taken Almost a
Century to Create, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 321, 321 (2003). The author suggests that
"[tihe focus of the NCAA is no longer on education and amateurism, as the NCAA
professes, but is rather on making the most money out of the product that the original
focus on amateurism created." Id. The NCAA has been thus likened to an economic cartel:
Cartel agreements typically restrict price competition and limit production to create
above-average profits from outputs and to generate a flow of economic rents from
inputs compensated below their market value. Ultimately, the NCAA maximizes
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NCAA generates (in excess of $422 million) give plenty of
evidence that college sports are no less commercial than
professional sports.1 8 9 Too often has the NCAA been able to hide
behind the image of academic promoter when promulgating its
regulations. The NCAA cannot have it both ways. It cannot
have conflicting mission statements of promoting the greater
good for student athletes while also seeking the highest amount
of profits possible.1 90
CONCLUSION

Therefore, this Note recommends that courts ignore noncommercial justifications for NCAA conduct. Analysis should be
focused on the effects that the regulations have on competition.
There can still be some allowance for restrictions that are needed
for the good of the industry, just like in professional sports.
However, the NCAA should be limited in the justifications that it
can claim. The NCAA, upon showing that its rules are harming
competition, should be forced to come up with commercial
justifications for its conduct. It may seem like a simple analysis,
but the early purposes of the Sherman Act were not complicated.
The Sherman Act sought to protect competition in all areas of
commerce.
In the past, the NCAA may have been a noncommercial entity, but not today. As soon as courts accept this
simple premise, they can stop weeding through the noncommercial 'fluff justifications that the NCAA throws out. This
narrowing of the issues will hopefully lead to a much more
consistent analysis in the future.
profits beyond a competitive rate and keeps the windfall in the hands of select few
administrators, athletic directors, and coaches.
Konsky, supra note 4, at 1585.
189 See Marc Edelman, Note, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards In Men's College
Basketball, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 861, 871 (2002). The NCAA no longer prevents
commercialism and attempts to exploits its athletes through corporate athleticism. See
Konsky, supra note 4, at 1584. The $422 million in revenues was reported by the NCAA
for the fiscal year ending August 31, 2003. Id.
190 See Kristin R. Muenzen, Weakening Its Own Defense? The NCAA's Version of
Amatuerism, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 257, 257 (2003) (commenting that basic purpose of
NCAA is to maintain clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and
professional sports); see also Sherman Act Invalidation, supra note 118, at 1299 (stating
that NCAA claims its primary purpose is to "maintain intercollegiate athletics as an
integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student
body, [and to] retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and
professional sports").
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POSTSCRIPT

On August 17, 2005, while the NCAAIMIBA trial was in
progress, both sides agreed upon a settlement.19 1 Under the
terms of the settlement, the MIBA received $56.5 million over
the next ten years from the NCAA.192 In return, the NCAA
received ownership of the NIT.193 Even though the NCAA can
seemingly do whatever it wants with the NIT, it has pledged to
continue holding the tournament for at least the next five
years.194 In the long run, this shortsighted decision by the MIBA
will harm not only college basketball, but college athletics as a
whole. What was shaping up to be an excellent case for the
MIBA was quickly swept under the rug by the NCAA and its
large pool of resources. That this suit was settled so easily only
speaks to the unfair bargaining power that the NCAA has when
going up against any competitors. The only positive thing that
can come out of this settlement is that the NCAA can no longer
argue that it does not hold a monopoly in the arena of college
basketball. Now, they are truly the only game in town, despite
the continuing existence of the NIT.195 The NCAA owns both
tournaments, and, at any point in time, it can pull the plug on
the NIT, or change eligibility rules to the point that the NIT
becomes even less of a factor than it already is today. With a
private suit now impossible, one can only hope that the
Department of Justice can step up to the plate and see the big
picture. If the NCAA is able to muscle out a plaintiff who had a
191 See Matisik, supra note 3 (explaining background of case when settlement was
reached).
192 See Brad Wolverton, NCAA Settles Lawsuit Over the National Invitation
Tournament, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 2, 2005, at 65 (explaining terms of
settlement); see also After All That, NCAA Buys NIT, CHICAGO TRIB., Aug. 18, 2005, at 9
(noting that MIBA ran NIT since 1940).
193 See Wolverton, supra note 192 (noting that NCAA will now pick teams for
participation in NIT); see also NCAA Digs Deep, Buys Rights to NIT; Texas, Oklahoma
Seek Improvements to Cotton Bowl, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 18, 2005, at 14 (noting that
NCAA will take control of NIT).
194 See Mark Alesia, NCAA's Brand: $56.5M Settlement with NIT is "Good for the
Game," INDIANAPOLIS STAR, AUG. 18, 2005 (stating that settlement guarantees that next
five NIT tournaments will take place in New York City); see also NCAA purchasesNIT for
$56.5 Million to End Legal Fight, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., Aug. 18, 2005 (noting that next
five games will be held in Madison Square Garden).
195 See Wolverton, supra note 192 (stating that NCAA will have control over NIT
tournament); see also Editorial, Hoops Win-Win' Isn't a Slam-dunk, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Aug. 19, 2005, at 14A (noting that only time will tell whether NCAA monopoly solution
will benefit college basketball).
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very strong case just by the use of money, what other potential
anticompetitive threats will it pose in the future?

